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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PENALTY
PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA
CRIMINAL STATUTES
VERNON W. CLARK*
The ramifications of the penalty provision of a criminal statute
probably outnumber those of any single item with which the Legislature of Florida deals. The impact of this provision upon the individual
for good or evil is tremendous, with society being affected accordingly.
It is apparent, therefore, that any legislation concerning criminal
penalties should be carefully considered before adoption or amendment.
An examination of many Florida criminal statutes reveals a serious
lack of appreciation by legislators of the significance of their penalty
provisions. Casualness in legislative treatment is apparent with discouraging frequency. This inadequate treatment is caused largely by
the failure of the Legislature to realize the significance of three aspects
of a penalty provision: (1) the classification of a crime as a felony or
a misdemeanor, (2) the maximum period of imprisonment, (3) the
minimum period of imprisonment. Each of these aspects warrants
careful consideration.
FELONY-MISDEMEANOR DISTINCIONS

Contrary to popular assumption, the maximum period of imprisonment has nothing to do with the classification of a crime as a felony
or a misdemeanor. Under Florida law any crime punishable by death
or imprisonment in the state prison is a felony' unless specifically
designated otherwise; 2 all other crimes are misdemeanors. 3 Capital
crimes differ from other felonies in several procedural aspects, 4 but
this does not affect the felony-misdemeanor distinction.
OA.B.E. 1932, University of Florida; MA. 1939, New York University; LL.B.
1942, University of Florida; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1955); FLA. CONST. art XVI, §25.
2Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 17 So.2d 521 (1944).
3FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1955).
4FLA. STAT. §932.05 (1955) (no statute of limitations on prosecutions), §909.21
(counsel may be appointed for indigent defendants), §912.01 (waiver of jury trial
prohibited), §913.10 (1) (jury of 12 required), §918.10(2) (jury charges must be in

[289]
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The difference between a felony and a misdemeanor under Florida
law is of substantial significance in regard to substantive or procedural
rights. This is true for the following reasons:
(1) Felony prosecutions involve several important segments
of the law that are not applicable to prosecutions for misdemeanors.5 The Florida statutes concerning accessories to
crimes, 6 jurisdiction of various criminal courts when juveniles
are accused, 7 habitual criminals,8 compounding felonies,9 unlawful homicide when another felony is involved, 10 justifiable
2
homicide," and crimes involving an intent to commit a felony,
such as burglary, are limited to felony prosecutions.
(2) Felony convictions produce results generally not characteristic of convictions for misdemeanors. Loss of certain civil
rights' 3 with restoration not a matter of right,"4 possible imwriting as well as oral), §919.23 (recommendation of mercy by jury has mandatory
effect), §39.02 (special provisions for transfer of juveniles from juvenile to criminal
court); FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §9 (bail not a matter of right except when proof

of guilt is not evident or the presumption great).
5FLA. STAT. §909.23 (1955), providing for the expediting of felony prosecutions,
although not a segment of law as used in this connection, should be noted.
6FLA. STAT. §§776.01,.03, 932.12-.13 (1955).
7FLA. STAT. §39.02 (1955).
8FLA. STAT. §§775.09-.11
(1955).
9FLA. STAT.
1oFLA. STAT.

§843.14 (1955).
§§782.04,.11 (1955).

"FLA. STAT. §782.02 (1955).
12FLa. STAT. §810.01 (1955).
'3FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§4-5; FLA. STAT. §97.041(4),(5) (1955) (exclusion from

right of suffrage), §§112.01, 876.25 (1), (2) (right of candidate to hold public office),
§§40.01 (2), 40.07(l) (right to serve as juror), §90.07 (right to serve as witness),
§§838.02, 876.25 (1), 114.01 (7) (disqualification to hold public office); FLA. CONsT.
art. IV, §15 (suspension and removal of public officers); Fla. Laws 1955, c. 29766
(right to own certain weapons).
14FA. CONsT. art. IV, §12, provides that the Pardon Board, with such limitations
and restrictions as it may deem proper may, inter alia, remit fines and forfeitures.
For many years the Attorney General of Florida has construed this language as empowering the Pardon Board to restore civil rights. RE. ATr'v GN.951-360 (1951).
Also see FA. STAT. §940.05 (1955) concerning restoration of civil rights after pardon.
It is doubtful that the civil right to serve as witness can be restored after conviction
of perjury. See FLA. STAT. §90.07 (1955). Under some Florida statutes licenses to
practice various professions may be revoked by appropriate authorities upon conviction of a crime, generally a felony. FLA. STAT. §§459.14(1), 458.12(b), 462.14,
46421 (1) (b) (1955). The privilege of engaging in one of these professions is not
considered a right the restoration of which occurs by the restoration of civil rights
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prisonment in the state prison, 5 larger fees for prosecutors, 16
and the necessity of registration as a felon in some counties unless civil rights are restored-r are, with a few possible exceptions,
limited to situations involving felonies.' 8
Proper criminal procedure often varies according to whether a
felony or a misdemeanor is involved. In relation to felonies Florida
statutes provide greater latitude in making arrests with or without a
warrant of arrest,19 restrict the disclosure of the return of an indictment,2 0 require the presence of the defendant at the trial and other
specified proceedings, 2 ' provide for expert witnesses for indigent defendants, 22 assure counsel for indigent defendants in capital felony
prosecutions, 23 authorize a greater number of peremptory challenges
by the Pardon Board. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Page v. Watson, 140 Fla.
536, 550, 192 So. 205, 211 (1938), stated: "The pardon [full] restored petitioner's
rights of citizenship, but it did not restore or affect his qualifications or his
character, or exempt him from the enforcement of the statute authorizing his
license to practice medicine to be 'revoked, suspended or annulled'...." See Annot.,
166 A.L.R. 249 (1938).
'0FLA. CONsr. art. XVI, §25: "The term felony, whenever it may occur in this
Constitution or in the laws of this State, shall be construed to mean any criminal
offense punishable with death or imprisonment in the State Penitentiary." It should
be noted that if the offense is punishable, as distinguished from actually being
punished, in the state penitentiary the requirement of the definition is met. FLA.
STAT. §775.08 (1955) contains substantially the same definition.
16FLA. STAT. §§27.24, 32.23 (1955).
17Fla. Laws 1937, c. 18107.
lSThe possibility of exceptions must be recognized. FLA. STAT. §97.041 (1955)
prohibits a person convicted of bribery, perjury, larceny, or any infamous crime
from voting until his civil rights are restored. According to State ex rel. Jordan v.
Buckman, 18 Fla. 267 (1881), a person convicted of petit larceny, a misdemeanor, is
thus deprived of his civil rights of suffrage until the right is restored. The Attorney
General of Florida in 1953 was of the opinion that this holding still represented
the law of Florida, even though it was recognized that the case was decided prior
to the adoption of the present Florida Constitution. REP. ATT'Y GEN. FLA. 72.
Although an opinion of the Attorney General is only advisory in nature, if this
ruling is representative of the actual law of Florida presumably the commission
of any crime listed in the Florida Constitution or a Florida statute that results in
loss of a civil right is operative regardless of whether the crime is a felony or a
misdemeanor.
19FLA. STAT. § §251.13 (2), 901.15,19 (1955).
20FLA. STAT. §905.26 (1955).
21FLA. STAT. c. 914 (1955).
22FLA. STAT. §932.30 (1955).
23FLA. STAT. §909.21 (1955).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss3/3

4

Clark: The Significance of Penalty Provisions of the Florida Criminal St
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
in the selection of a petit jury,24 and provide for more serious consequences when an officer voluntarily allows his prisoner to escape.25
The jurisdiction of some courts is determined exclusively by the
26
classification of the crime involved.
An analysis of the items mentioned above reveals that the substantive and procedural law in most respects is devised to protect the
rights of both the state and the defendant by making available more
elaborate means of dealing with a felony than with a misdemeanor.
One exception to this may be found in relation to the law of accessories.
The distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact is an unwarranted stumbling block to the prosecution because of the refinements between the presence and absence of an
obvious abettor during the principal's criminal act. The speciousness of
this distinction in Florida is emphasized by the fact that each class is
2
treated the same with reference to the maximum penalty. 7
Another exception to the proposition that the felony classification

24FLA. STAT. §918.08

(1955).

25FLA. STAT. §843.09 (1955).
26FLA. STAT. §§34.01 (4), 86.01 (4)

(1955) provide respectively for the original
trial jurisdiction of criminal cases in county courts and county judges' courts. This
jurisdiction includes all misdemeanors committed in the particular county. Fla. Laws
1927, c. 11975, provides for the trial of all misdemeanors committed in Dade County
to be in the Court of Crimes. FLA. CONSr. art. V, §5, provides that all appeals of
felony convictions shall be to the Supreme Court of Florida. FLA. STAT. §§26.53,
924.08 (1955), FLA. CONsT. art. V, §11, provide that all appeals of misdemeanor convictions in criminal courts of record, county courts, and county judges' courts must
be taken to the circuit court. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 27258, provides that all appeals of
misdemeanor convictions from the Civil and Criminal Court of Record of Pinellas
County must be to the circuit court.
27FLA. STAT. §776.01 (1955). An additional reason for eliminating this distinction is found in the Florida Supreme Court's position in Penny v. State, 140 Fla.
155, 161, 191 So. 190, 193 (1939), that the distinction between principals and accessories must be preserved in the manner of stating the charge:
"'[O]ne charged as an accessory before the fact to a felony cannot, unless charged
with a substantive offense under the statute [FLA. STAT. §776.02], be tried before
the principal offender is tried, nor can he be sentenced before the principal has
been sentenced....
"'When an accessory before the fact is not indicted or informed against under
[FLA. STAT. §§776.01-.02] as for a substantive offense, but is indicted or informed
against in the common-law mode, which is permissible under our statutes, the
common-law rule controls as to the manner of stating the charge, trial and punishment of such accessory before the fact....
"The Constitution guarantees to every accused person . . . the right to know
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is limited to more serious crimes is found in some statutes denouncing
as felonies acts that should not, by comparison with other felonies and
by accepted standards of human justice, be placed in this classification.
Statutes providing for minimum sentences of two years in the state
prison for the larceny of certain animals regardless of their value,28
when compared with the multitude of other statutes dealing with
larceny, bespeak little but vindictiveness of spirit on the part of the
Legislature. Lack of knowledge of the significance of the felony-misdemeanor distinction can also be amply illustrated by felony statutes
providing a maximum period of imprisonment in the state prison of
one year,20 the same maximum period contained in numerous misdemeanor statutes. 30
THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT

Although an erroneous assumption prevails to the effect that a
higher statutory maximum period of imprisonment is always required
in cases of felonies than in cases of misdemeanors, this assumption is
inconsistent with the definition of a felony in Florida. 31 This assumption is consistent with the more serious consequences incident to a2
3
felony conviction and with the history of the classification of crimes.
The Florida felony statutes with the maximum periods of imprisonment set at one year, 33 however, indicate a legislative variance from
this view, whether conscious or otherwise.
It is possible that the maximum period of imprisonment may be
the key to legislative intent in a particular case. Illustrations may be
found in the general statute on murder in the first degree.34 According
'the nature and cause of the accusation against him,' and it necessarily follows that
the accused cannot be indicted for one offense and convicted and sentenced for
another, even though the offenses are closely related and of the same general nature
or character and punishable by the same grade of punishment."
28FLA. STAT. §§811.11-.12, .14-.15 (1955).
29E.g., FLA. STAT. §§795.01, 797.02, 817.16, 8&2.01, 104.40 (1955).
30E.g., FLA. STAT. §§783.02, 784.05, 796.01, 831.23 (1955).
31FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1955).
32At common law crimes were classified as treason, felony, and misdemeanor. A
felony was distinguished from a misdemeanor by virtue of the nature of the punishment. A felon forfeited lands and goods; a felony was generally considered a
capital crime. All crimes not treason or felonies were misdemeanors. Bannon v.
United States, 156 U.S. 464 (1895).
33See note 29 supra.
34FLA. STAT. §782.04 (1955).
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to this statute, two ways of committing this crime are the unlawful
killing of a human being while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate either arson or kidnaping. There are four degrees of arson 35
and two statutes providing penalties for kidnaping 3 in present Florida
law. All of these crimes are felonies; yet, because of the variations in
length of maximum sentences, it is apparent that some of them are
not contemplated by the first degree murder statute.
Effects
The maximum period of imprisonment sometimes discourages
prosecutions. Probably the most prevalent situation of this type arises
when the maximum period is recognized generally as being so liberal
toward the violator that it may well result in a mockery of the law.
This seemed to be true in Florida in relation to the crime of aggrafrom a
vated assault until the Legislature changed the crime in 1955
37
misdemeanor to a felony and raised the maximum penalty.
It would be interesting to be able to determine the extent to
which the maximum period of imprisonment is considered by a jury
in the deliberation of its verdict. A court is required by law to include the maximum penalty in its instructions to the jury. 38 There
exists the possibility that a jury, in considering its verdict with regard
to a crime with an unreasonably high maximum period of imprisonment, may rest its verdict primarily on this fact. It is true that a jury
may recommend the guilty party to the mercy of the court; 39 but,
though such a recommendation is no doubt often persuasive, it has
no mandatory legal effect upon the power of the court to sentence in
anything but capital convictions.40
It is admitted by some Florida judges that the maximum
statutory period of imprisonment is an important factor in
their determination of a sentence. Various judges consider their
36F.A. STAT. §§805.01-.02 (1955).
36FLA. STAT. §§805.01-.02

(1955).

37FLA. STAT. §784.04 (1953), until amended in 1955, contained a penalty provision
of imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $500. As amended
the maximum period of imprisonment was set at 5 years and the maximum fine at

53,000.
§918.10 (1) (1955).
§919.23 (1) (1955).
§919.23 (2) (1955). A majority of the jury is required to recommend
mercy in a capital case in order to have any legal effect.
3sFLA. STAT.

39FLA. STAT.
46FLA. STAT.
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actions as lenient or severe solely with respect to the proximity of
the particular sentence to the maximum limit. The Supreme Court
of Florida has recognized that a sentence, although legal in
every respect, may be so severe that action by the "Parole Board"
is warranted.4 ' One trial judge stated to the writer, "I deplore
the fact that the legislature gave me such a large field in which to
graze when it set the maximum penalty in this statute. In some cases
I can't satisfy anybody that I am being fair."
The maximum period of imprisonment directly affects the term
for which a person may be placed on probation. A defendant found
guilty by verdict or plea may be placed on probation except for an
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment;42 the period of
probation can extend for as long as two years beyond the maximum
term for which the defendant might have been sentenced. 43
The maximum period of imprisonment also affects parole. The
Parole Commission of Florida weighs many factors before granting or
refusing to grant a parole; 44 one of these factors is the length of the
sentence. In the absence of a pardon a person cannot be discharged
from parole prior to expiration of the term for which he was sentenced; 45 consequently, if the penalty provision affects the length of
the actual sentence it must, of necessity, affect the parole period.
Alternate Periods
The majority of the felony statutes of Florida establish the county
jail as an alternate place of imprisonment. They also provide for
maximum pecuniary fines.
Generally the maximum period of imprisonment in this type of
felony statute is greater with regard to imprisonment in the state
prison than in the county jail. This difference is quite substantial
in some cases. The statute on manslaughter, for example, provides
that the maximum period of imprisonment is twenty years in the state
4lLipford v. State, 53 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1951).
42FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1955).

•13FA. STAT. §948.04 (1955).
44FLA. STAT. §947.16 (1955).
45FLA. STAT. §947.24 (1955). It seems, however, that this statute is subject to an
exception when the Pardon Board, by virtue of its power to commute punishments
under FLA. CONSr. art. IV, §12, substitutes a lesser period of imprisonment for the
one contained in the sentence. In such a situation the parole period would not be
for the unserved part of the original sentence.
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prison but only one year in the county jail. 46 The comparatively low
maximum period of imprisonment in the county jail seems to have
been dictated by recognition of the practical fact that imprisonment
for a period of months as opposed to more than one year can be administered adequately on the local level, but that the service of a
longer sentence generally requires facilities more easily obtainable
on the state level. This fact did not operate in the passage of all
criminal statutes, however; the effect of one misdemeanor statute is
47
to provide for a maximum period in the county jail of five years.
Many felony statutes do not have provisions for an alternate period
of imprisonment in the county jail.48 According to an opinion of the
Attorney General of Florida, a sentence of imprisonment in the county
jail upon conviction under such a statute is void.49 It is not unknown
in Florida for a person to be convicted under a statute of this type,
sentenced to the county jail, serve his entire sentence, and then have
the error discovered. Whether the state is estopped to impose further
punishment is an interesting question as yet unanswered by the Florida
Supreme Court; it might well depend on the nature of the crime involved and the punishment already suffered.5 0
Inconsistent Penalties
A statute may be passed that overlaps an earlier statute that is still
retained on the statute books. If the maximum penalties in the two
statutes differ, it may become urgent to resolve the question of repeal
by implication. This seems to be the situation relative to the present
general larceny statute, 51 passed in 1951 presumably to cover, inter alia,
52
the situations previously covered by the general statutes on larceny,
46FLA. STAT.

§782.07 (1955).

47FLA. STAT. §548.01 (1955)

(prize fighting). This statute does not specify the
place of imprisonment. According to FLA. STAT. §775.06 (1955), whenever punish-

ment by imprisonment is prescribed and the imprisonment is not expressly directed
to be in the state prison, it shall be held to be in the county jail. Thus such a crime
is not punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or by death and cannot be
a felony unless so specified in the statute.
48E.g., FLA. STAT. §§784.04, 782.04, 836.05 (1955).
49Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 056-18

(Jan. 1956).
5oIbid. The writer questions the implication of the opinion to the effect that
the state is not estopped in any case of a void sentence.
5iFla. Laws 1951, c. 26912, now FA.. STAT. §811.021 (1955). For a discussion
of this situation see Note, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1956).
52FLA. STAT. §§811.01-.02 (1955).
53FLA. STAT. c.

812 (1955).
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embezzlement, 53 and obtaining property by false pretenses. 54 The
maximum period of imprisonment specified in the later larceny statute
is five years, 55 while the maximum under the older statute on obtaining
property by false pretenses is ten years. 56
A more recent problem in this respect has arisen with the passage
in 1955 of statutes in regard to accepting a bribe, 57 which, in addition
to other items, seem to include everything covered by a statute already
on the books. 5s The penalty provisions of the statutes comprise the
problem. One of the penalties provided under the earlier statute is
forfeiture of and disqualification for public office, but this penalty is
not included in the later statutes.
THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT

Any adequate discussion of the minimum period of imprisonment
must include consideration of the maximum period of imprisonment.
Consequently, though the ultimate concern will be with the minimum
period, much of the following discussion applies to both periods.
Theories of Punishment
Periods of imprisonment, as contained both in the criminal statutes of Florida and in criminal statutes everywhere, are the products
of someone's conception of the purposes that punishment should serve.
While everyone has his own conception of these purposes, people seldom express these concepts in words and probably would have difficulty
in doing so.
Most of the major aspects of the purposes of punishment, as recognized from the earliest times and as gradually evolved in succeeding
generations, seem to have played their parts, in some degree at least,
in the penalty provisions of the criminal statutes of Florida. The
theories of crime prevention, crime deterrence, reformation, education,
54FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1951).

55FLA. STAT. §811.021 (2) (1955).
56FLA. STAT. §817.01 (1951). In Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1956), the
1951 general statute on larceny, FLA. STAT. §811.021, was held to supersede the
earlier statute dealing with obtaining property by false pretenses, FLA. STAT.
§817.01. The primary reason for the holding was based on the inconsistency of the
penalty provisions of the two statutes.
57FLA. STAT. §§838.012-.013 (1955).
58FLA. STAT. §838.02 (1955).
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and treatment of the offender, as well as the ancient retributive theory
that the purpose of punishment is punishment, 59 have been utilized,
consciously or unconsciously, by the Legislature in dealing with
various types of offenders.
It must be recognized that these theories are not mutually exclusive
60
and that several may be involved in relation to the same statute.
For example, the mandatory death penalty in the first degree murder
6
statute when no recommendation of mercy is made by the jury ' is
retributive in effect and, in the opinion of many, deterrent in nature
from the standpoint of the general public.6 2 The various statutes
4
whereby the larceny of hogs6 3 and other especially protected animalsG
is made a felony regardless of value evidently were passed with the
ideas of retribution, crime prevention, and deterrence in mind. The
juvenile courts act6 5 is based largely on educative and reformative
theories, with the jurisdiction of criminal courts and application of
criminal law and criminal penalties applying only in isolated situations. The child molester law66 and the act dealing with criminal
sexual psychopathic persons67 are evidences of acceptance of theories
of reformation and scientific treatment. At least one, and generally
more than one, of the theories is apparent in every criminal statute.
Evidence of recent legislative dissatisfaction with the manner in
which the theories of punishment have been applied by prior legislatures is found in (1) the relaxation in 1947 of the penalty for rape by
adding imprisonment for a term of years to the possible punishments
of death or life imprisonment; 68 (2) the amendment in 1953 of the
first degree murder statute by adding the felonies of abominable and
detestable crime against nature and kidnaping; 69 (3) the rendering in
70
1951 of most criminal penalties inapplicable to delinquent children
and the subsequent amendment in 1955 restoring their applicability
59SNYDER, CRIMINAL JusTICE

20-23 (1953).

60d. at 24.
§782.04 (1955).
62Younger, Capital Punishment: A Sharp Medicine Reconsidered, 42 A.BA.J.
113 (1956).
63FLA. STAT. §811.14 (1955).
64FLA. STAT. §811.11 (1955).
65FLA. STAT. C. 39 (1955).
66FLA. STAT. c. 801 (1955).
67FLA. STAT. §§917.04-.11 (1955).
68Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24285, now FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1955).
69FIa. Laws 1953, c. 28023, now FLA. STAT. §782.04 (1955).
7oFIa. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §.
6lFLA. STAT.
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to felonies punishable by death or life imprisonment in cases in
which indictments have been returned; 71 (4) the imposition in 1953 of
a minimum period of imprisonment of ten years in the state prison
for robbery72 and its elimination in 1955;73 and (5) the amendment of
the aggravated assault statute in 1955 by raising the maximum period
of imprisonment from one year to five and changing the crime from
74
a misdemeanor to a felony.
There is a definite trend in this country to enact laws that emphasize the theories of reformation of the offender 7 5 and consequent crime
prevention. The recognition that the great majority of persons imprisoned will eventually return to society, and the further recognition
that if these persons are not returned as better citizens society will
suffer, has led to legislation devised with the primary object of rehabilitation of the prisoner and of his release when this object
has been accomplished. Crime prevention has also been an important
object in such legislation. Important examples of this type of legislation are the indeterminate sentence and parole laws.
The Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Laws
The great majority of the states have indeterminate sentence laws
in one form or another.76 Usually they provide for a sentence by the
court to a term of imprisonment in minimum and maximum terms,
such as from two to five years, the range being set by statute.7 7 Such
a sentence is generally deemed to be for the maximum period, which
means that the prisoner has no legal right to be released after serving
the minimum period; 78 but after he serves the minimum term a
designated authority, usually the parole authority of the state, may
determine if and when his release on parole is consistent with the good
of society.75 He may be released under the supervision of the parole
authority for the remainder of his sentence. Usually the indeterminate
7lFIa. Laws 1955, c. 29900, now FLA. STAT. §39.02 (6) (1955).
72FIa. Laws 1953, c. 28217.
73Fla. Laws 1955, c. 29930, now FLA. STAT. §813.011 (1955).
74Fla. Laws 1955, c. 29709, now FLA. STAT. §784.04 (1955).
75Bennett, CorrectionalProcesses, 1948-49 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COP. 73; Note,
33 NEB. L. REv. 467 (1954).
70Bennett, supra note 75, at 76; Note, 50 H.ARv. L. REv. 677, 678 (1937).
7732 B.U.L. REv. 349, 350 (1952).
781bid.
79E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. §807 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1955); IND. STAT. ANN.
§13-1533 (Burns 1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. §30-4-106.1 (1955).
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sentence laws are limited to felonies, 0 with the exception of a few of
the more serious felonies.81 The advocates of these laws feel that this
procedure is a great step in the direction of assuring the return to
society of a rehabilitated person instead of a potential repeater.82
An additional step advocated by some is the elimination of the
minimum sentence. Then the parole authority could be empowered
to make desirable releases immediately upon its determination of
sufficient rehabilitation, instead of being restricted by the requirement
of serving the minimum tenn. 3 This attitude has made little headway in the form of legislation;84 the legislatures seem unwilling to
give the parole authorities such unfettered power.85 Some of the legislative sentiment no doubt stems from the apprehensiveness of public
reaction against too liberal treatment of violators of the criminal law.8 6
Other legislation, directed toward the rehabilitation of criminals in
connection with various aspects of probation,8 1 is discussed under
"Effects," infra.
How does the foregoing discussion apply to Florida, particularly
in relation to the minimum period of imprisonment provisions of
the criminal statutes? Florida has no indeterminate sentence law, but
it does have many statutes providing for minimum penalties. 88 This
would seem to indicate that Florida, in one respect at least, is interested
in obtaining its "pound of flesh" but not interested in what happens
to the prisoner except to assure his punishment. However, the parole
laws are exceedingly liberal in Florida, thereby tending, as compared
with other states, to equalize the authorized area for activities directed
toward rehabilitation. In Florida a person serving a sentence for misdemeanor may be paroled under certain circumstances,9 which is not
true in many states having indeterminate sentences; 90 and a prisoner,
80E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

§2949.12 (Page 1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6128

(1955); see Note, 50 HAav. L. REv. 677, 681 (1937).
81E.g., N.Y. PEN. CODE §2189; WIs. STAT. §959.051 (1955).
827 CALIF. L. REv. 132 (1919).
831d. at 135; Note 50 HARv. L. REv. 677, 686 (1937).
84Note, 50 HARV. L. REv. 677, 680 (1937). Even the comparatively recent California plan, which wrought significant changes in the penal system of California,
retained a minimum period of imprisonment as a prerequisite to the granting of a
parole; see CALIF. PEN. CODE §1168 (1949).
85See 7 CALIF. L. REv. 132 (1919).
s633 NEB. L. REv. 467, 475 (1954).
87FLA. STAT. c. 948 (1955).
88E.g., FLA. STAT. §§779.07-.08, 811.11, 849.09 (2) (1955).
8FLA. STAT. §947.16 (1) (1955).
90See note 80 supra.
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even under a sentence of life imprisonment, is eligible for consideration for parole after serving six months of his sentence. If a sentence
or cumulative sentences total from twelve to eighteen months a
prisoner is eligible for consideration for parole after serving one third
of the sentence. 91 The liberality of these laws in regard to rehabilitation of prisoners becomes more apparent when compared with laws
of other states. Most jurisdictions require a longer period in relation
to all crimes before eligibility for consideration for parole is established,
92
some as high as twenty years in the case of a life sentence.
Under some indeterminate sentence laws the judge has authority
to specify a longer minimum term of imprisonment than that set by
statute,9 3 thereby lengthening the term the prisoner must serve before
being eligible for consideration for parole.9 4 In Florida the majority of
the criminal statutes specify no minimum period of imprisonment, and
the court apparently has no authority to specify one. The result is
that the minimum period of imprisonment is set by the parole laws. 95
When Florida statutes contain provisions for minimum periods of
imprisonment the court apparently is required to pronounce a sentence of at least the minimum, but this fact does not seem to affect
the power of the Parole Commission to deem the prisoner eligible for
consideration for parole. In this state, therefore, a prisoner generally
becomes eligible for consideration for parole earlier than in states
9
having indeterminate sentence laws. 6
Effects
The question arises as to whether a statutory minimum period
of imprisonment in excess of the minimum set by the parole law is
of any real significance under present Florida law. The answer must
be in the affirmative, since this requirement directly affects parole,
the trial court's power to suspend the imposition of sentence, and
probation.
As previously stated in relation to the maximum period of im9'FiA. STAT. §947.16 (1) (1955).
92E.g., WIs. STAT. §57.06 (1955).
03See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §2:192-4 (1955); Note, 50 HARv. L. REv. 677, 681

(1937).

4
Orne v. Rogers, 32 Ariz. 502, 260 Pac. 199 (1927); Ex parte Jordan, 190 Cal.
416, 212 Pac. 913 (1923); see 32 B.U.L. 349 (1952).
95FLA. STAT. §947.16 (1) (1955).
9OSee notes 87, 88 supra.
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prisonment, the sentence governs the time that a prisoner released on
parole must remain on parole.9 7 A lengthy minimum period of imprisonment tends to assure a more severe sentence; this, in turn, tends
to increase the length of the parole period and thus may adversely
affect efforts directed toward the rehabilitation of the parolee.
Parole is also affected in that the length of the sentence may be
misleading to parole authorities in considering parole for a particular
prisoner unless the mandatory element is kept in view, since the length
of the sentence often is indicative of the attitude of the court toward
the convicted person and the seriousness of the offense.
It is interesting to note that under present Florida law a sentence
of less than one year is not affected by the parole law regardless of
whether it is mandatory or discretionary with the court.98 'Consequently, if a minimum sentence for such a period is actually imposed it
must be served in its entirety, in the absence of reprieve by the governor 99 or action by the Pardon Board. 19 On the other hand, a period
of imprisonment for one year or more is subject to the action of the
Parole Commission;10 1 if a minimum sentence of such a period is imposed the prisoner need serve not more than six months, and in cases
of sentences ranging from twelve to eighteen months only one third
02
of the sentence, in order to be eligible for consideration for parole.1
Consequently, a person receiving a sentence of eleven months must
serve the entire sentence, while one receiving a sentence of one year
would be eligible for consideration for parole after serving one third
of the year and, if otherwise qualified in the opinion of the Parole
Commission, could be released on parole.
A statutory requirement of a minimum period of imprisonment
may force a court to use its power to suspend the imposition of sentence rather than impose what it considers an unjust minimum sentence. After adjudging a person guilty, a trial judge in Florida has
three courses of action open in lieu of imposing sentence:
97FLA. STAT.

§947.24 (1955).

§947.16 (1) (1955).
CONsT. art. IV, §11, authorizes the governor to grant reprieves for a
period not exceeding 60 days for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment. No
express limitation on the number of successive reprieves that a governor may grant
appears in the Constitution.
0ooFLA. CONsr. art. IV, §12, authorizes the Pardon Board to commute punishment
and grant pardon in all cases except treason and impeachment.
lOiFLA. STAT. §947.16 (1955).
lo21bid.
98FLA.

STAT.

99FLA.
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(1) He may merely defer the passing of sentence and allow the
convicted person to go free under this suspension with no
specific condition concerning possible revocation of the suspension order.'0 3 Such a sentence apparently can remain
suspended indefinitely. 10 4
(2) He may suspend the imposition of sentence pending fulfillment of any reasonable condition placed upon the convict by the court, such as "during good behavior."' 0 5 An
order of the court entered under certain such conditions
also seems to have no limitations as to its duration.106
(8) He may suspend the imposition of sentence and place the
convicted person on probation by issuing an order of probation. 0 7 This procedure is subject to certain statutory
limitations that do not apply to the first two procedures.
A trial court has no authority to place on probation a
person who has been convicted of an offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment.""' If a valid order of probation is issued the probationer must be placed under the
supervision of the Parole Commission of Florida; 0 9 this
is true even in relation to the few courts for which probation officers have been provided by other statutes"10 and
who are not employees of the Parole Commission.
While the third procedure seems to be the most desirable from the
standpoint of the rehabilitation of the convicted person, the restriclo3Pinkney v. State, 160 Fla. 884, 37 So.2d 157 (1948).
l04See Clanton v. State, 96 Ala. 111, 11 So. 299 (1892); Ex parte Williams, 26
Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890); Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 82 At. 424 (Ch.

1912).
l0SBrill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (1947).
'10See 3 MIAMx L.Q. 304, 305 (1949): "The majority view declares that the
power to suspend sentence may be exercised only to a limited degree while a
minority view maintains that it is within the complete discretion of the court....
Florida has consistently held to the minority view." In Brill v. State, supra note
105, the order suspending the imposition of sentence was revoked more than 7
years after it was made and a sentence of 6 months in the county jail imposed for
the commission of the offense. The maximum sentence that could have been imposed at the time the sentence was suspended was 6 months; see FIA. STAT. §562.45
(1941) for the applicable penalty provision.
107FLA.
108FLA.
109FLA.
120FLa.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§948.01 (3)(1955).
§948.01 (1) (1955).
§948.01 (4) (1955).
§949.03 (1955).
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tions connected with it sometimes lead a court to use one of the
other two. Whether the selection of the procedure by the court is
dictated by the desire to evade imposition of a minimum sentence,
it seems desirable that everyone free by virtue of the suspension of
sentence should be placed on probation and thus be under the supervision of a competent body. In order to accomplish this objective and
at the same time make the law of probation and the inherent power
of the court to suspend imposition of sentence equally co-existent, it
seems necessary to eliminate the statutory provision denying probation to a person convicted of an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment. This assumption is made because of the serious doubt
of the power of the Legislature to prohibit the court from suspending
the imposition of sentence in such cases, since this power has been accepted as inherent in the court in some jurisdictions."'
It is fortunate that the majority of the criminal statutes of Florida
contain no provision for minimum periods of imprisonment and unfortunate that there are any at all. The Legislature's attempt to prejudge a case is largely frustrated by the power of the court to suspend
the imposition of sentence and by the parole laws. This seems desirable,
since, no matter how serious a crime may be in theory, the mitigating
factors present in a particular case cannot be foreseen, or adequately
dealt with, by a legislative body.
Under present Florida law there seems to be no necessity for adopting indeterminate sentence laws as they exist generally in other
states. California has one provision in its indeterminate sentence
law that eventually may prove advantageous if added to Florida law.
The trial court is not authorized to fix either minimum or maximum
terms of imprisonment in the sentence."J 2 The parole authority is
empowered to terminate the period of imprisonment when the prisoner
is considered to have been sufficiently rehabilitated." 3 Before the
parole authorities may exercise this power, however, the statutory
minimum term must be served.1 4 The reluctance of the legislative
body of California to give the supervisory body unrestricted authority
11E.g., Huggins v. Caldwell, 223 Ky. 468, 3 S.W.2d 1101 (1928); People ex rel.
Hirschberg v. Seegar, 179 App. Div. 792, 166 N.Y. Supp. 913 (2d Dep't 1917), appeal
dismissed, 223 N.Y. 659, 119 N.E. 1069 (1918); see Commonwealth v. Carelli, 90
Pa. Super. 416 (1927).
112aAL. PEN. CODE §1168 (1949).
"13CAr. PEN. CODE §3020 (1949). The board authorized to determine whether
parole is to be granted is called the Adult Authority.
"14CAL. PEN. CODE § §3020, 3023 (1949).
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to make decisions seems to be a general characteristic of other states.
OTHER ASPECTS OF PENALTY PROVISIONS

In order to complete the discussion concerning the penalty provisions of Florida criminal statutes it is necessary to consider four
items the importance of which is not based on the felony-misdemeanor
distinction or on the maximum or minimum periods of imprisonment.
These items are penalties by reference, the judgment, the sentence, and
criminal liability of corporations.
Penalties by Reference
The Florida Legislature has seen fit to provide in some criminal
statutes that the penalties for their violation shall be ascertained by
reference to other statutes." 5 This procedure can lead to complications. An illustration is found in the statute on subornation of perjury.
The penalty provision of this statute is stated in the following manner:
"Whoever is guilty of subornation of perjury .. . shall be punished
in the same manner as for perjury.""16 This language leaves doubt
as to which perjury statute is the appropriate one to be used. If it
is assumed that the proper statute is the one violated by the person
procured to commit the perjury - and this is a logical assumption - a
rather ludicrous situation may arise. Although the general perjury
statutes in Florida are felony statutes,"17 the violations of some perjury
statutes,18 dealing with particular situations, constitute misdemeanors
only. Consequently, under the above assumption if one person procures another to violate one of the latter statutes, both the suborner
and the perjurer are guilty of misdemeanors; but, if the one solicited
to commit the perjury refuses, the person soliciting or inciting the
other is guilty of a felony, since this is specifically covered by another
statute."" In other words, if the one soliciting the perjury to be committed is successful he commits a misdemeanor; if he fails, he commits a
felony.
Penalties by reference should be the exception rather than the rule
in devising criminal statutes, and when utilized they should be exiSFLA. STAT. §§812.01-.05 (1955).
I1FLA. STAT. §837.03 (1955).
'17FLA. STAT. §§837.01-.02 (1955).

118FLA. STAT. §§476.23, .26 (1955).
1'OF.A. STAT. §837.04 (1955).
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pressed in unambiguous language specifying the exact statute containing the actual penalty provision. The further possibility that the
statute containing the penalty provision may be amended or repealed
should lead to a more limited use of this manner of ascertaining the
proper punishment.
Judgment and Sentence
The penalty provision, like all other statutory provisions requiring
human administration, has been subjected to human frailty, and justice
has suffered thereby. Even though this provision of a statute may be
technically perfect, negligence or inadvertence in its administration,
either by entry of an erroneous judgment 120 or the pronouncement of
an erroneous sentence12' after entry of a valid judgment, may delay
justice by necessitating appellate or other proceedings, or even defeat
justice if the error remains undiscovered or uncorrected.
Another problem in connection with the sentence concerns concurrent and consecutive sentences of imprisonment. At times a single
trial involves two or more crimes that are charged in the same indictment or information 12 2 or in separate indictments or informations, 12
and convictions of more than one crime have followed. The problem in
such situations is whether the sentences of imprisonment shall run
concurrently or consecutively. A Florida statute provides for this
situation if the court does not specifically designate whether they shall
run concurrently or consecutively. 124 In spite of the existence of this
2 oE.g., House v. State, 127 Fla. 145, 172 So. 734 (1937). No adjudication of guilt
was contained in the judgment, rendering both the judgment and sentence incomplete. For a thorough discussion of illegal judgments and sentences in Florida
criminal cases see Note, p. 348 infra.
121E.g., Walden v. State, 83 So.2d Ill (Fla. 1955) (conviction of breaking and
entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor followed by adjudication of guilty
and sentence for burglary; case remanded because judgment and sentence erroneous);
Williams v. State, 69 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1953) (sentences on several counts of an information charging variations of the same offense set aside and trial court ordered
to enter one sentence; sentence of one year in state prison for commission of a
misdemeanor declared void); Shuler v. State, 57 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1952) (case remanded
because of sentence of one year in state prison at hard labor when statute provided only for sentence to county jail or fine).
122E.g., Norwood v. Mayo, 74 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1954) (forgery and uttering forged
instrument charged in same information).
123E.g., Wright v. Mayo, 85 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1956) (defendant adjudged guilty
in 13 different cases).
124FL. STAT. §921.16 (1955): "When the defendant has been convicted of two
or more offenses charged in the same indictment or information or in consolidated
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statute, however, the failure of the court to make a definite provision
in this regard may lead to needless delay in the proper administration
1 25
of the penal laws.
Criminal Liability of Corporations
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated:12
"It is the rule that, except where the only punishment for
an offense is death or imprisonment, a corporation may be held
criminally liable for acts of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, even though the act constituting the offense may be
ultra vires, or one as to which a specific intent is essential.
And the fact that the punishment for an offense is either fine or
imprisonment, or both, will not ordinarily render the offense
inapplicable to a corporation."
It is apparent, therefore, that a consideration of the penalty provision
of the criminal statute in question is necessary in order to determine
whether a prosecution for its violation can be validly instituted against
a corporation, regardless of the acts or the omissions of the officers
of the corporation.
CONCLUSION

A cynic might offer the observation that if the Legislature of
Florida had refrained from repudiating the common law modes and
degrees of punishment 27 the law concerning criminal penalties would
be less complicated even though more severe in its consequences.
The fact remains, however, that great care must be exercised in devising and amending a penalty provision of a criminal statute. This
indictments or informations, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently
unless the court expressly directs that they or some of them be served consecutively.
Sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same indictment or information shall be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that they
or some of them be served concurrently."
122E.g., Hall v. Mayo, 83 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955), involved the question of whether
three informations had been consolidated in order to make FLA. STAT. §921.16 (1955)
applicable. The litigation would not have been necessary in relation to this point
if the trial court had specified whether the sentences were to run consecutively
or concurrently.
126State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1951).
1-7FLA. STAT. §775.01 (1955).
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provision is largely concerned with human freedom and welfare, and
the vast body of law with which it is concerned is indicative of the fact
that casualness in treatment should play no part in its inception or
continuity. The recognition of these facts is the basis of the following
suggestions pertaining to Florida law:
(1) The definition of "felony" should be changed in order to
assure that it will be the more serious of the two classifications of crimes in all respects. This definition is suggested as a substitute for the present one: "Any crime
punishable by death or imprisonment for one year or more
is a felony." All other crimes should be considered misdemeanors. Statutory variations from these definitions
should be rendered nullities. This suggestion, if implemented, would necessitate an amendment to the present
Florida Constitution; it is a proper subject for consideration by everyone interested in a new constitution for
Florida.
(2) Imprisonment for felonies should be in the state prison;
imprisonment for misdemeanors should be in the county
jail.
(3) The possibility of the loss of a civil right because of commission of a misdemeanor should be eliminated. Again, an
amendment to the Constitution is involved.
(4) The distinction between principals and accessories before
the fact should be eliminated.
(5) A "habitual criminal" statute based on the commission of
misdemeanors should be enacted.
(6) Legislative bills containing maximum penalties obviously
based entirely on a spirit of vengeance should not be enacted into law.
(7) Statutes containing minimum periods of imprisonment
should not be passed, and those already in the laws of
Florida should be amended to delete such provisions.
(8) All felony statutes should include an alternative period of
imprisonment in the county jail up to, but not including,
the minimum limit of imprisonment in the state prison;
this assures to a court more latitude in its effort to achieve
justice when imposing sentence. The lack of such a provision tends to create pressure on the trial judge to increase

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1956], Art. 3
FLORIDA PENALTY PROVISIONS

(9)
(10)

(11)

(12)

(18)

the length of a sentence in a case in which he does not wish
to suspend sentence, since he may be reluctant to impose a
sentence to the state prison for a period of months even
though this is all that he is convinced the convicted person
should serve.
Statutes containing inconsistent penalties should be repealed or properly amended.
Increased co-operation between the court and the prosecutor and constant vigilance by defense counsel should prevail in order to minimize the possibility of illegal judgments and sentences.
Trial courts and prosecutors should exercise care in seeing
that the intent of the court as to concurrent or consecutive service of sentences is dearly expressed.
The penalty for the violation of a statute dealing with one
crime should not be required to be ascertained by reference
to the penalty provision of another statute.
Finally, no Floridian need apologize for the absence of an
indeterminate sentence law. In some respects Florida has
a more advanced statutory set-up directed toward rehabilitation of prisoners than many states that have enacted indeterminate sentence laws. This set-up can and will be
improved with additional experience and facilities in parole administration, with a desirable ultimate object of
granting to the parole authorities the power to terminate
the sentence at the proper time rather than continue the
parole period beyond the point of greatest return.
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